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Executive Summary
Countries introduce a deposit insurance system to prevent bank-run and stabilize the
financial market by protecting depositors. However, deposit insurance with a flat-rate system
induces the insured banks to take more risky activities, an example of moral hazard. To deal
with this problem, the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation ('KDIC') adopted a Risk-Based
Insurance Program ('RBIP') for the Savings Banks ('SBs') on July 1, 2013, by charging a higher
rate for the weak SBs and a lower rate for the healthy SBs. To mitigate the initial drastic impact
on the SBs in an economic regression, the KDIC had reduced the difference between the regular
rate and the higher rate by 90% and the difference between the regular rate and the lower rate
by 50%, which is called a soft landing period.
In this paper, I tested the hypothesis that the RBIP in the soft landing period is not
sufficient to motivate the SBs to reduce their risk. Also, I tested another hypothesis that the
healthy SBs respond better to reduce the risk level rather than the weak SB, because the lower
rate as the motivation is more attractive than the higher rate.
I constructed a balanced panel data for the SBs in Korea, and I employed a fixed effect
model with instrumental variables to deal with an unobservable individual effect and an
endogenous variable. The RBIP rate in the soft landing period was not sufficient, and the reason
is that the weak SBs are predicted to increase the risk contrary to the purposed direction of the
RBIP.
Based on my finding, it can be concluded that the KDIC should expand the current
differential rate for the weak SBs at least, if it wants to achieve the goal of restricting the risk of
the SBs.
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1. Introduction
All banks are required to pay the insurance premium to the deposit insurer every year.
In return for this payment, the banks are free from a threat of bank-run because depositors
believe that their deposit will be safe even if their bank fails. In Korea, the insurance premium
rate had been the same for all Savings Banks ('SBs') until June 30, 2013. Starting from July 1,
2013 1, a differential insurance premium rate program called ‘Risk-Based Insurance Program’
('RBIP') went into effect for all SBs. Under the new program, the deposit insurer (the Korean
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 'KDIC') can charge a higher insurance rate to a SB with high
risk
The purpose of the RBIP is to provide a motivation for the SBs heavily exposed to risks
to reduce their risk. The healthy SBs can take advantage of the discounted insurance rate. By
contrast, the weak SBs will pay a financial punishment. So the weak SBs are expected to
decrease the risky behaviors to diminish the penalty. Through this mechanism, the RBIP is
anticipated to decrease the possibility of financial failure of the SBs.
But some experts doubt that RBIP will have a substantial influence on the SBs, because
the current scale of the differential rates (-0.02%p, +0.004%p) is too narrow to motivate the SBs
to change behavior during the soft landing period. I therefore would want to investigate the
effectiveness of the current RBIP designed by the KDIC. This study pays attention to the point
of whether the SBs reduce the risk during the soft landing period, and how the healthy or weak
SBs will behave in the RBIP. The results of this study will be expected to be necessary and
meaningful information to help the KDIC to improve the RBIP.

1Other

than Savings banks whose accounting year runs from July to June , the RBIP went into effect on January 1, 2013
for commercial banks.
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2. Literature Review
Theoretical Background
In most countries, governments make an effort to regulate risks of banks by using
financial safety nets. According to the Financial Stability Forum (2001), financial safety nets
consist of three elements: (i) a deposit insurance system; (ii)a central bank (as a lender of last
resort); and (iii) a regulatory framework. The deposit insurance system is fundamental to
promote financial stability in the banking system. Anticipating that deposits are guaranteed
under a deposit insurance system, depositors will not rush to withdraw their money deposited
in the bank, thereby averting a contagious bank-run and reducing the social costs of a banking
crisis (Abdullah S. & Adlina S, 2014). Despite its stabilizing effect, a flat-rate deposit insurance
has the negative effect of raising moral hazard (Chu, 2003). Theoretical works mostly confirm
that a flat-rate deposit insurance is responsible for increasing the risk-taking activity in banks
arising via moral hazard (Davis and Obasi, 2009).
A flat-rate system has an influence on increasing moral hazard in two ways. First, the
flat-rate deposit insurance induces insured banks to pursue more risks because they can capture
any profits while incurring no additional insurance expense. Second, the flat-rate deposit
insurance reduces incentives of depositors to monitor banks' moral hazard. In a world with no
deposit insurance, a risky bank will have to pay depositors more interest to attract them. In a
world with deposit insurance, however, depositors do not need to demand more interest
because the deposit insurer will guarantee their deposits, regardless whether the bank takes
high risk. Thus deposit insurance gives banks incentives to take added risks (McCoy 2007).
In dealing with the increased moral hazard of banks, various financial studies have been
5

developed. In the guidance to curtail moral hazard, the IADI (International Association of
Deposit Insurers) states various means, including: (1) regulatory discipline, i.e. bank regulations,
such as capital minimum requirement, and prompt corrective action order ; (2) market
discipline, i.e. monitoring by depositors 2 or creditors; and (3) managerial self-discipline, i.e. the
prevention of large risks. Among regulatory means, the RBIP could be recommended as one of
the important tools.
If deposit insurance premiums are linked to risk (namely RBIP), the added cost may
deter excessive risk-taking activities and help mitigate moral hazard (IADI guidance, 2013).
Because it causes high insurance expense. Since each bank pays a different insurance rate, its
ability to attract the depositors will be different from the others. The RBIP would prompt the
insured banks to think twice before embarking on a higher risk activity because the insured
banks have to pay a higher premium. It is believed that because of this penalty, banks would
have the incentives to reduce their risk exposure (Abdullah S. & Adlina S, 2014).
However, the IADI gives notice that RBIP is most likely to have its desired effect on
banks’ risk-taking when the industry is healthy or sound. Introducing RBIP when a substantial
number of banks are vulnerable or weak may lead to their further decline. Also, Prescott (2002)
derived the theoretical conclusion that if a deposit insurer does not know which investment
strategy a bank takes, the RBIP alone cannot control moral hazard. He emphasized that
supervisory activities like safety and soundness exams, audits, and off-site surveillance play a
crucial role in the successful RBIP implementation.

2 The deposit insurer sets a coverage limit under which an individual's deposits are partially guaranteed.
The deposits exceeding to the limit will be excluded from the coverage. So, depositors will voluntarily
pay attention to the soundness of the bank.
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Empirical Examination
The majority of researchers have found that a flat-rate system gives banks an incentive
to increase risk-taking. As to the effect of the RBIP, only a few studies have been reported so far.
Since the RBIP generally tends to be introduced along with some regulatory measures, it is hard
to extract its sole net effect out of those measures. Consider the case of the USA. In 1991, when
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act ('FDICIA') was passed, a RBIP
and Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 3 were introduced together for the commercial banks.
Consequently, the effect of RBIP cannot be easy to be separated from that of the PCA.
Comparing post-FDICIA with pre-FDICIA, though, Lisa Birr (2001) explained that the
regulatory changes proposed by the FDICIA were effective in their ultimate goals: lowering
risk-taking behaviors by commercial banks. This finding does not identify a separate positive
effect of the RBIP, however.
Cornett, Mehran and Therantian (1998) examined the impact of announcement that the
RBIP will be introduced. During 1991-1993, on 13 each day when the announcement had been
released, they tracked the movement of the stock prices of banks and investigated whether there
was excess return on the those stocks as a way to test the impact of RBIP announcement. Their
empirical results lead to the conclusion that stock prices of well-capitalized banks reacted
significantly and positively to announcement that signaled an introduction of RBIP. On the
other hand, less-capitalized banks had the significant negative returns on those event days.
They found out that the stock market responds strongly to the announcement for the RBIP.
Chang and Chen (2002) examined the risk-shifting behaviors of Taiwan’s commercial
3 The PCA provisions became effective in December 1992 (Section 131 of FDICIA).
It requires the federal regulators to take an action against the under-capitalized banks to impose penalties,
such as submission an acceptable plan to restore their less-capital or restriction of paying dividends.

7

banks before and after the RBIP the Taiwanese government adopted. They found that the RBIP
had no effect in restraining risk-taking behavior for commercial banks in Taiwan. They
explained that the internal trends of financial liberalization and internationalization might be
some of the reasons why it failed. Although the RBIP system was adopted, financial
liberalization decreases the regulatory discipline, and provides the commercial banks with an
environment where higher risks are taken easily without restriction. Furthermore, the
differential rate between the grades - 0.0025%p or 0.005%p - is too small to prevent bank from
taking high risks.
Abdullah S. & Adlina S. (2014) examined how the transition from a flat-rate system into
a RBIP affects the risk-taking behaviors of banks in Malaysia. After the RBIP, banks’ credit risk
is estimated to increase by 76.9%, and an operational risk is estimated to increase by 26.2%.
They pointed out that the main reason why the RBIP did not have the expected effect may result
from an inadequate risk evaluation by the deposit insurer. Too small a premium for the higher
risk creates a favorable regulatory circumstance for the small banks to increase their risk-taking,
because these banks are not penalized with higher premiums. Therefore, the implementation of
the RBIP in Malaysia aggravates the moral hazard problem especially in the small conventional
banks instead of reducing it.
The empirical results, except the case of the FDIC, do not support the theoretical
direction and expert's expectations. It implies that only when other environments are favorable
to implement the RBIP and the differential rate is enough high, the RBIP will has a substantial
effect to reduce the risk of banks.
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3. Research Design
3.1. Risk-Based Insurance Program in Korea
In Korea, there are two types of depository banks. Commercial Banks offer banking
services for everyone across the country. Savings Banks (SBs) are only allowed to offer banking
services within a particular local area, so their scale is limited. As of December 2010, the total
number of SBs is 105. Twenty-four SBs were closed dramatically between 2011 and 2012 due to
the continuing economic regression after a global financial crisis in 2008.
Figure 1. The Number of SBs, Asset, and Return On Asset(ROA)
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The remaining SBs barely survived. It seemed that depositors became concerned about
the financial vulnerability of the SBs and moved their funds elsewhere. In response to an
adverse environment, the Financial Services Commission ('FSC')took several actions. It allowed
the KDIC to investigate the potentially problematic SBs starting from March 2012, the minimum
capital ratio which the SBs must meet was raised from 5% to 6% starting from July 2012. And,
the Bank of Korea also lowered the standard interest rate six times since July, 2012. These
policies helped the SBs to recover gradually from difficult time since 2012 so far.
Also, to resolve the moral hazard which was pointed out as the reason for the SBs'
9

failures in 2011~2012, the RBIP went into effect for the SBs on July1, 2013.The implementation of
the RBIP is based on a law 4 passed by the South Korean Congress. Under the law, the KDIC had
designed the RBIP structure in 2012 and shared the evaluation method with all remaining SBs.
This evaluation model consists of a quantitative method (80%) and a qualitative method (20%).
In the quantitative method, three types risks are measured as a score,
1) ability to cope with a crisis (Indicators :Bank for International Settlements ratio etc.),
2) asset soundness (Indicators :Non-Performance ratio etc.),
3)recovery ability from losses (Indicators : Return On Asset etc.).
After the KDIC evaluates the risk level of each SB, it classifies each SB into one of the
three groups (Grade 1, Grade 2, Grade 3). Then each SB is charged a differential rate (lower, 0,
higher) according to the group, the rate which is added to the regular rate of 0.4%. According to
the law, the KDIC can set the penalty rate up to the legal limit of 0.04%p. Also, it can set the
discounted rate up to the legal limit of -0.04%p.
At the time when the RBIP was designed, the SBs had a hard time in struggling to
survive. As the IADI guided, the KDIC worried that the RBIP might lead the vulnerable SBs to
further decline. The KDIC, to avert the negative impact on the struggling SBs, decided to set a
soft landing period from 2013 to 2016. During this period, the lower rate was reduced to be 50%
smaller (-0.04%p → -0.02%p) than the legal limit. Also, the higher rate was reduced to be 90%
smaller (+0.04%p → +0.004%p) than the legal limit (KDIC 2014 annual report). The higher rate
for the weak SBs was thought of as a heavy burden enough to make their financial state worse.
So, a higher rate range (0.004) was smaller than a lower rate range (0.02). As a result of the
reduced differential rates, in November 2014 the first year after the implementation of the RBIP,
4 Article 30 (1) of the Depositor Protection Act was amended in February 2009.
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the KDIC announced that the insurance premium income from all SBs had decreased by about
$1.5millionin comparison with a flat-rate system (2014.11.14, KDIC). It indicates that the
severely reduced higher rate for the weak SB led the whole premium income to decrease.
Table1. The differential rates in RBIP of the KDIC
Grade
Grade 1 (healthy)
Grade 2
Grade 3 (weak)

Soft Landing Period

Normalization Period

2013.7~2015.6

~2016.6

2017~2018

2019~2020

2021~

-0.02%p

-0.02%p

-0.02%p

-0.028%p

-0.04%p

-

-

-

-

-

+0.004%p

+0.01%p

+0.02%p

+0.028%p

+0.04%p

(source :KDIC 2014 annual report, 54p)

3.2. Hypotheses
According to the theory, the RBIP offers a motivation for banks to reduce the risk.
However, empirical studies in other countries failed to support it. Chang and Chen (2002), and
Abdullah S. & Adlina S. (2014) pointed out the possible reasons : 1) in case the deposit insurer
conducts an inadequate evaluation, 2) in case the differential rate is too small to have an
influence on the banks, 3) in case other time or institutional trend intervenes with the effect of
the RBIP.
Initially, the KDIC paid more attention to a stable operation of the RBIP by diminishing
the financial burden on the SBs. To do so, it has decreased the differential rates. Additionally,
the reduced higher rate of +0.004%p is as small as +0.005%p of Taiwan, where the differential
rate was found too small to affect the banks. Thus, unlike the rationale of the theory, I presume
that the current differential rates of the KDIC are too small to have an impact on the SBs. I want
to build the hypothesis as follows :
11

(Hypothesis 1) The RBIP in the soft landing period is not sufficient to motivate the SBs
to reduce their risk.
In the soft-landing period, the lower rate range (0.02) for the healthy SBs is greater than
the higher rate range (0.004) for the weak SB. The incentive of the healthy SBs will be stronger
than one for the weak SBs. It will drive the healthy SBs to be more sensitive to reduce risks. So, I
specify the second hypothesis as follows :
(Hypothesis 2) During the soft-landing period, the motivation for the healthy SBs will
be stronger to reduce their risks than one for the weak SBs.

3.3. Data and Variables
3.3.1 Data
I collect the SBs' financial data for four years starting from July 2011 to June 2015, and
the observed frequency is every half year. During the study period, the 70 SBs had kept
operating the business. Among them the five SBs, as the outliers, are excluded from this study
because two SBs showed the extremely high BIS ratio and three SBs fell under a different
regulation rule by the FSC. Finally, financial data on the 65 SBs over 8 half years is obtained
through the website 5 by Financial Supervisory Service in Korea. Using this data source, I
constructed a balanced panel data set which consists of 520 observations.

5 http://fisis.fss.or.kr/fss/fsi/id/fssmain.jsp
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Table2 : Data
types
Number of SBs
Observation times

Details
65
8 (half years)

note
total : 520 (=65*8)

3.3.2 Dependent variable
In this paper, the risk level of the SBs is the dependent variable. Risk can be defined as
the chance of loss. In general, there are two ways of measuring the risk ; capital market
based measure or accounting based measure. With regard to the former, some scholars have
measured the risk by using the volatility (standard deviation) of each bank's ROA, because high
volatility is a sign of higher risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). However it is hard to get
information unless the bank's stock is listed. Unfortunately, there is no SB whose stock is listed
in the Korean stock market.
Instead there is an accounting based risk measure. Capital adequacy ratio, a percentage
of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted asset, means how much capital the bank has in order to
deal with the unexpected loss or risk. If the risk increases, it will increase the risk-weighted
asset, then the capital to the risk-weighted asset will become relatively small, finally the capital
adequacy ratio will decrease. As an international standard indicator, the Bank for International
Settlements ratio ('BIS ratio') 6 has been developed to ensure that banks can absorb a reasonable
level of losses before becoming insolvent. Also, the KDIC uses the BIS ratio to evaluate the SBs'
risk.
The 'BIS ratio' is used as a proxy variable for the risk. When it comes to the BIS ratio, it
covers the risks, such as the insolvency risk, credit risk. Over this study period, the average 'BIS
6BIS ratio = Capital/ Risk-Weighted Asset
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ratio' of all SBs are distributed around 15%, which has grown gradually over time.
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Figure 2: The distribution of the BIS ratio of the SBs over the study time period
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3.3.3. Variables of Interest
The 'RBIP' is a dummy variable. If the time is after July 1 2013, its value is 1. Otherwise 0.
The 'healthy SBs' is also a dummy variable that stands for a financially strong enough
SBs to endure the unexpected loss. At the end of previous time period, if a SB's BIS ratio exceeds
an average BIS ratio of all SBs, the value of the 'healthy SBs' will be 1. Otherwise, 0, meaning the
weak SBs. This value can change every half year depending on a SB's performance at the end of
each period. And 'RBIP & healthy SBs' is an interaction term which connects the 'RBIP' with the
'healthy SBs'.
3.3.4.Control variables
The moral hazard induced by adopting the deposit insurance system is kept in check
through several factors: regulatory, market, and self-discipline. Since those factors restrict the
risk level of a SB, I will employ them as the control variables. With regard to the regulatory
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discipline, if a financial performance is less than a minimum criteria (BIS 5%), a SB will be given
a special administrative command by the FSC. Then risky activities will be prohibited. If a
financial performance is put below the other criteria (BIS 5%+2%p), the KDIC would investigate
whether there are improper behaviors. I built 'specially regulated SBs', which is a dummy
variable. If a SB comes under those circumstance within a time period of t-1 or t-2, its value will
be 1 at a time t, because the special command or special investigation is made at least 6 month
after finding a low BIS ratio.
Next, depositors with short-term deposits (one year or less) will tend to be sensitive to
the interest rate, pursuing a high earning. But if a depository SB is closed due to insolvency,
depositors would have to wait to be repaid usually 3 months until the needed procedures end.
So, they have a motivation to avoid a SB with high risk when selecting a SB in which to put their
deposit. This behavior acts to monitor a risk level of the SB. I built the variable of 'weight of
short-term deposits', expressed as a percentage to an amount of debt in a SB.
In case of self-discipline, a type of ownership or a share rate of ownership will be useful.
The 'individual ownership' is a dummy variable, if yes, its value is 1. Otherwise an organization
is 0. Usually, an individual owner struggles to monitor the managers' behaviors, and then this
SB is likely to be exposed to higher risk. And if the 'stock rate of ownership' is greater, she will
have more interest in monitoring what the managers are doing well for the bank.
To control for the effect of size of the SB, I will use the variable of an 'asset'.
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Table 3:Summary of the variables
variable
names

variable type
Dependent

Interest

Control

Unit of
measure

Expected
Direction

BIS ratio

%

-

RBIP

1, if yes
0, not

healthy SBs

1, if a SB exceed an average
BIS ratio at t-1. If not, 0

RBIP & healthy SBs

Interaction term

specially regulated SBs

1, if yes
0, not

Positive

weight of short-term
deposits

%

Positive

individual ownership

1, if yes
0, not

Negative

Not sufficient
More sensitive

stock rate of ownership %

Positive

asset

Negative

Log

Table 4:Descriptive statistics for the variables
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

BIS ratio

520

14.14

8.65

-20.41

60.04

RBIP

520

0.50

0.50

0

1

healthy SBs

520

0.45

0.50

0

1

RBIP & healthy SBs

520

0.21

0.49

0

1

specially regulated SBs

520

0.26

0.44

0

1

weight of short-term deposits

520

91.51

7.69

11.82

99.43

Individual ownership

520

0.53

0.50

0

1

stock rate of ownership

520

0.59

0.29

0.13

1

asset

520

12.61

0.86

10.33

15.18
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3.4. Model
Even though each SB has a uniform risk management system under the same regulation,
an individual risk preference which is unobserved will make a distinct risk culture. This risk
preference affects the SB to decide whether to purchase the high risk product or attract the
short-term deposits. This is likely to be correlated with 'asset', or 'weight of short-term deposits'.
The fixed effect model will be appropriate to control for individual risk preference.
Then in the fixed effect model, there is an endogeneity problem caused by the reverse
causality between 'asset' and 'BIS ratio'. The increase of an 'asset' will decrease the 'BIS ratio'
mechanically because it is a denominator in calculating the BIS ratio but also for economic
reasons as size the target 'BIS ratio' affects the risk (risk-weighted asset). To deal with the
endogenous variable 'asset', the two instrumental variables are used .One is a 'lagged asset', and
the other is the 'number of employees' at time t. It assumes that both instrumental variables
have a relationship with the change of 'asset' and do not directly affect the 'BIS ratio' (dependent
variable). To consider the endogenous variable, the Fixed Effect with the Instrumental Variable
(Instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models) will be employed.
In addition, I will consider the time effect. The reason is that the 'BIS ratio' is strongly
affected by the economic macro variable, such as an interest rate, and GDP growth rate.
Actually BIS ratio has grown over study time period. To extract out these macro effects properly,
I will use the time dummy variables (λt) before and after the RBIP respectively. After all, my
final fitted models are follows :
<Model(1) - For hypothesis 1>
BIS ratioit=β1RBIPit+β2specially regulated SBsit + β3weight of short-term depositsit +
17

β4individual ownershipit+β5stockrate of ownershipit+ β6asset it+ ui+ λt+εit-------------- (1)
where 'asset' is an endogenous variable, then the two instrumental variables (lagged
asset, number of the employees) are used. 'ui' stands for an individual effect, and 'λt' stands for
a time effect. And, 'ε' is an error term.
<Model(2) - For hypothesis 2>
BIS ratioit=β1RBIPit+ β2healthy SBsit+β3RBIP&healthy SBsit + β4specially regulated SBsit +

β5weight of short-term depositsit + β6individual ownershipit + β7stockrate of ownershipit +
β8assetit + ui+ λt + εi---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2)
where 'RBIP & healthy SBs 'is the interaction term to test for the sensitivity of the healthy
SBs to the BIS ratio in the RBIP.

4. Results and Implication
4.1 Validity Check
The Hausman test showed that the fixed effect is more appropriate than the random
effect by rejecting the null hypothesis that the fixed effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables. Thus the fixed effect model is used to test my hypothesis.
The IVs (lagged asset, number of the employees) used to control the endogenous
variable of 'asset 'should meet the two requirements : relevance and exclusion restriction. First
requirement - relevance - is tested through the Anderson and Cragg-Donald-Wald test. By
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rejecting the null hypothesis 7, these results show that the IVs are sufficiently correlated with the
endogenous variable 'asset'. Second requirement - exclusion restriction - is indirectly tested
through the Sargan test. By accepting the null hypothesis 8, it supports the assumption that the
IVs do not directly affect the dependent variable 'BIS ratio'. In sum, it shows that the hypotheses
that the fitted models with IVs will work correctly are not rejected in the data.
4.2 Results
As Figure 2 showed above, the average BIS ratio has increased over time. In the result of
the model (1), the coefficient estimates of the time dummies are significantly positive at 10%, 5%,
1% level. It implies that time effect such as the GDP growth rate explains the change of the 'BIS
ratio'. But since the p-value (0.836) of the coefficient of 'RBIP' in the model (1) exceeds the
significant level, it shows that the 'RBIP' is not associated with the 'BIS ratio'. The conclusion is
that the RBIP was instituted during a period of improving bank condition, and there is no
evidence that the 'RBIP' motivates the SBs to increase the 'BIS ratio'. Its result supports
Hypothesis 1.
In the model (2), the interaction term 'RBIP & healthy SBs' can be interpreted how well
the healthy SBs increase the BIS ratio compared to the weak SBs in the RBIP. The coefficient of
the 'RBIP' in the model (2) means the effect on the weak SBs, and the effect on the healthy SBs is
the coefficient of 'RBIP' + 'RBIP & healthy SBs'.
In the result of the model (2), the coefficient estimate of 'RBIP & healthy SBs' has a
significantly positive value of 2.088 at the1% level, then it concludes that when the RBIP is
implemented, the 'healthy SBs' is more sensitive to increase the BIS ratio by 2.088%p than the
7 The null hypothesis that the IV is not correlated with the endogenous variable.
8 The null is that the IV is not correlated with the residuals (dependant variable).
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weak SBs. It supports the Hypothesis 2. Also, the 'RBIP' has significantly negative value of 1.136 at the 10% level. This result shows that the weak SBs will decrease the BIS ratio by 1.136%p when the RBIP is implemented rather than not implemented. This is in the opposite
direction of the effect of the RBIP. As for the 'healthy SBs', they have the significant positive
value of 0.952 (= -1.136 + 2.088). There is an evidence that the RBIP affects the 'healthy SBs' to
increase the BIS ratio by 0.952%p. This model (2) shows that the effects of the RBIP are more
positive on 'healthy SBs', more negative on weak SBs, not as intended.
Besides the variables of interest in this study, the control variables are predicted to have
the significant results as expected. Specifically, the 'weight of short-term deposits' representing
the market discipline shows the significantly positive association with the BIS ratio in the model
(1) at 10% level and the model (2) at 5% level. It means that as the weight of short term deposit
increases by 1%, the BIS ratio is predicted to increase by roughly 0.05%p. And if the SB is under
'individual ownership', its BIS ratio is predicted to decrease by -2.7%p~-2.8%p. If the 'stock rate
of ownership' increases by 1%p, it is predicted to increase the BIS ratio by roughly 0.05%p.
Contrary to the expectation, the 'specially regulated SBs' in the model (1) has a negative
relation to 'BIS ratio'. It seems that it is already financially vulnerable, so it is difficult to restore
the normality, even though it gets a special order. And the 'asset' is found insignificant variable.
It means that the size of the SB is not significant factor to affect to BIS ratio.
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Table 5:Results

VARIABLES
Dependant
RBIP

Model (1)

Model (2)

BIS ratio

BIS ratio

-0.168
(0.598)

-1.136*
(0.639)
1.927**
(0.790)
2.088***
(0.613)
-0.664
(0.458)
0.0532**
(0.0258)
-2.809***
(0.825)
0.0508***
(0.0184)
-0.781
(2.044)
-1.240**
(0.600)
-1.046*
(0.591)
-0.603
(0.584)
1.847***
(0.588)
2.223***
(0.586)
3.181***
(0.590)

healthy SBs
RBIP ×healthy SBs
specially regulated SBs
weight of short-term deposits
individual ownership
stock rate of ownership
asset
time1
time2
time3
time6
time7
time8

Observations
Number of SBs
R-squared

-0.921*
(0.470)
0.0502*
(0.0263)
-2.709***
(0.842)
0.0503***
(0.0190)
-1.629
(2.096)
-1.070*
(0.612)
-1.022*
(0.610)
-0.488
(0.601)
1.791***
(0.608)
2.065***
(0.604)
3.057***
(0.609)
520
65
0.217

520
65
0.268

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 Implication
The separate effect of the RBIP on the both sides of the SBs shows that the weak SBs are
predicted to respond in the opposite direction to the healthy SBs. The weak SBs are predicted to
continue doing the risk-taking activities while increasing the risk as they did in a flat-rate
system. The weak SBs with the higher rate of +0.004%p will increase the risk directly. However
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the healthy SBs are predicted to reduce the risk. It can infer that this difference results from the
different range of differential rates on the same conditions of other factors. Specifically, the
severely reduced differential rate for the weak SBs is too small to motivate them. This accounts
for the reason why the RBIP does not work for all SBs, the healthy SBs are better to reduce the
risk than the weak SBs.
As long as the weak SBs do not respond to reduce the risk, the RBIP cannot be successful.
So, specifically the current differential rates for the weak SBs should be expanded because it
does not work for them.

5. Limitations
This study period contains just two years after the implementation of the RBIP. It may
be so early to examine the effect of it, and an observation period may be too short to estimate
the effect. Because of the short observation period, it appears that the strong time effect
interferes with the effect on the RBIP. In the future, more studies will be expected to examine
the effect of the RBIP after ending the soft landing period set by the KDIC. And I cannot access
the individual premium rate which is determined for each SBs, because its release is not
allowed by the law. If it can be used, it is possible to examine how the premium rate affects the
risk in each SB.
In this study, I depend on the BIS ratio as a proxy for the risk. It contains the credit risk,
and insolvency risk. Besides them, there are lots of risks in the SBs such as market risk, interest
risk, and liquidity risk.
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6. Conclusion and Recommendation
The purpose of my study was to test whether the RBIP in Korea has an impact on
reducing the risk of the SBs during the current period. The RBIP has little impact on reducing
the risk, or even increases the risk for weaker banks. Based on past research, one main reason is
that the current differential rate in the current RBIP is too small to impact on motivating the SBs.
The recommendation from this test result is that the KDIC needs to expand the
differential rate for the weak SBs at least, if it wants to achieve the goal of restricting the risks of
the SBs.
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Appendix
a. The Result for the Validity Test (Model1)
Hausman Test Result
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2 (13) = (b-B)'[ (V_b-V_B)^ (-1)] (b-B)
=
34.77
Prob>chi2 = 0.0009
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
The Validity Test Result about IV
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):
100.348
Chi-sq (2) P-val = 0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):
62.531
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size
19.93
15% maximal IV size
11.59
20% maximal IV size
8.75
25% maximal IV size
7.25
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):
0.420
Chi-sq (1) P-val = 0.5172
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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b. The Result for the Validity Test (Model 2)
Hausman Test Result
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2 (13) = (b-B)'[ (V_b-V_B)^ (-1)] (b-B)
=
98.85
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
The Validity Test Result about IV
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):
100.385
Chi-sq (2) P-val = 0.0000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):
62.278
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size
19.93
15% maximal IV size
11.59
20% maximal IV size
8.75
25% maximal IV size
7.25
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):
0.295
Chi-sq (1) P-val = 0.5870
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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